Shamir or Blakley secret sharing schemes are used for the authentication process in the studies before, but still secure group authentication and hand-over process remain as challenges in group authentication approaches. In this study, a novel method is proposed to provide a secure group authentication.
4
(BS) and mobile stations (MS). In the study, each MS needs to repeat the authentication process with the BS to have a group authentication. But this kind of authentication takes too much time and resource for distributed networks. Also, there is no proposal for authentication between MSs connected to the different BSs.
HashHand [5] is another proposal to hand over nodes between access points in mobile networks. The proposal is a good example of implementation of ECC and bilinear mapping for hand-over purposes. Mobile nodes only consumes source in order to calculate bilinear pairing for authentication code. The most source consuming jobs are done by the authentication server and the structure is not group-based. Therefore; we can assume the proposal a centralised authentication method.
ECC with RSA algorithm is used in [6] in order to overcome with the vulnerabilities in HashHand. The algorithm works faster than HashHand and uses less computational power. But it is still a centralised authentication method.
Another hand-over method in centrally managed systems is the PairHand method [7] . When a mobile node wants to connect with another access point, it calculates a value using its private key and the new access point's public key and shares it with the access point. The access point confirms the value with its private key and the public key of the sending mobile node. The method is not a group-based authentication solution.
The same authors show that PairHand's solution is vulnerable to session key compromise attack in the same year [8] . They produce a solution to the problem of Pairhand algorithm. They recommend that the mobile node in the Pairhand algorithm should send a timestamp before starting the authentication process with the access point.
Conference key distribution system (CKDS) is proposed in order to create a secret between n members in a group [9] . However, this method is one-to-one rather than a many-to-many method and causes a huge amount of time and resource consumption.
Authors propose a method in order to integrate control and non-payload communication link which is used between unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) and ground control station (GCS) into LTE network in [10] . All the credentials are selected and coordinated by an authentication server (AuS) and UAVs have end-to-end connections with server. This proposal is also suitable to authenticate one UAV at once. Therefore; the method is one-to-one authentication [10] .
The basis of distributed group authentication schemes is that a secret value is divided into pieces and then secret is recovered by using the pieces. The foundation of the studies in this area was built in 1979 by two different researchers. The Shamir secret sharing (SSS) method was proposed by Adi Shamir [11] . In the same year, the concept of key safeguarding was revealed by George Robert Blakley [12] . Both SSS and key safeguarding schemes are called threshold schemes. According to key safeguarding scheme, a secret can be decomposed into shadows and secret can be recovered from any r or more set of the shadows. But no one can have any information about secret by having s or fewer set of the shadows (r = s + 1) [13] .
Asmuth and Bloom propose a key safeguarding scheme, which is based on the Chinese remainder theorem (CRT). If anyone has shadows upto r, y can be computed easily using CRT and then secret can be recovered. But anyone who has r − 1 shadows can not recover the secret [13] .
Another secret sharing method [14] is developed using Gray code and XOR operations. The recommended method is for a group of 7 users. 3 or 7 of these 7 group members should come together in order to recover the master key. Although it is seen as a secure method, it is not stated how to share the secret key securely between these members. By eavesdropping to these communications, any attacker can capture secret keys and calculate the master key. At the same time, there is no solution for more than 7 participants.
Harn proposes an algorithm for group authentication in [15] . The algorithm is built based on the SSS. The authentication is not one-to-one type authentication as currently used authentication methods. The algorithm provides authentication for several nodes at the same time. This is called many-to-many authentication type. One of the nodes selects a random polynomical f (x) of degree t − 1 : f (x) = a 0 + a 1 x + ... + a t−1 x t−1 mod p where p is a prime number. The secret for the communication is a 0 which is the constant term of the polynomial. The node calculates one secret and one private key for each nodes in the group. Then, the node distributes the keys to the nodes in the group. Each group calculates the secret by lagrange interpolating formula. In the algorithm, many-to-many authentication is done. However; there is no proposal for hand-over of nodes between two different groups.
The authors propose an algorithm by using Paillier threshold cryptography in [16] . They compare their result with Harn group authentication method and present the results from their experiments. The results from [16] show that their algorithm has a better computational time than the Harn group authentication algorithm. But they don't take into account the computational cost of public and private key encryptions. They also don't propose any method for hand-over of nodes between two different groups.
Paillier threshold cryptography method is used in [17] in order to authenticate many devices at once. It is not specified in the article how to distribute private keys securely.
Chien [18] shows that the Harn schemes allow some attacks. If an attacker can get k distinct values in k different trials, the secret function chosen by group manager (GM) can be solved and all users' secret can be obtained. Chien proposes a new method based on SSS, ECC and pairing-based cryptography in order to ensure a secure group authentication process. According to proposal, GM selects two additive group G 1 , G 2 and one multiplicative group G 3 with order q. GM makes a generator P for G 2 public. A polynomial with degree t − 1 is chosen. The constant term of the polynomial will be the master secret s. The value of Q = s · P is computed and shared publicly. For each user, one public key x i and one private key f (x i )
are chosen and shared with related users secretly. Users participating the authentication phase agree on a random point R v on G 1 in authentication phase. Then, each user computes
and releases c i R v . After all users release the c i · R v , each user computes
holds. The algorithm provides security for group authentication except node compromise and DOS attack. On the other hand it is resource consuming method for users. Chien also don't propose any hand-over algorithm in his study as well.
III. PROPOSED METHOD
In our proposal, we use the same (t, m, n) logic as in Harn's algorithm. There are n users in the group and m users want to authenticate each other. t is the threshold for the algorithm (t < m < n). n should be greater than m and the secret can be obtained by the participation of m or more users.
It should be noted at this stage that the proposed method can especially be in use for a public safety networks (PSN) and the Internet of Things (IoT) networks. More than one group takes part in our scenario. Each group has a group manager denoted by GM. GM is assumed to be infrastructure-based and does have relatively more computational power. All group managers can communicate with each other securely via traditional cryptographic methods. In addition to the group managers, each group has several other members which have resource or computational constraints.
Note that if the PSN environment is under consideration, GM is basically the ground radio stations (GRS) and the group members are UAV devices. Similarly, gateways with specific capabilities in an IoT environment are GMs and radio frequency identification tags can be considered to be other members in a group. The capabilities of tags and UAV devices are at a certain restricted rate. Under these considerations we propose a novel method. The proposed method has three stages. The first stage involves authentication which is based on ECC and SSS. The Initialisation Phase:
1) GM selects a cyclic group G and a generator P for G.
2) GM selects a bilinear map e : G × G → G ′ and an E = Encryption() and D = Decryption() algorithms.
3) A polynomial with degree t − 1 is chosen by GM and the constant term is determined as master key s.
4) GM selects one public key x i and one private key f (x i ) for each user in the group U where each user is denote by U i for i = 1, . . . , n.
5) GM computes
6) GM makes P, Q, e, E, D, H(s) public and shares f (x i ) with only user U i for i = 1, . . . , n.
The confirmation phase is executed after GM shares the values with the related users. There are two different options in the confirmation phase. One of them is that the GM will be responsible to confirm the group members. In the other case, that is if GM is not responsible, any member within the group will confirm the other members. Repeat.
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Any user computes c i =f
(−x r /(x i − x r )) for each user. 2) If GM verifies the authentication, GM computes f (x i ) · P for each user and verifies whether the values are valid or not.
3) If GM is not included in the verification process, any user in the group computes
for each user.
4) User verifies if
=Q holds.
5)
If it holds, authentication is done. Otherwise; the process will be repeated from the initialization phase.
Both authentication by GM and any group member is given in the Algorithm 1. It is clear that group members should only compute one elliptic curve multiplication operation. And also users should send their identification numbers by concatenating with public shares in order to avoid confusion for further communications. Because; these public shares will be used by other users in further communications and in the group key agreement stage. All group users should know which public share belongs to which user.
After authentication is done, users will communicate with each other by using symmetric key encryption. Shared key for symmetric key encryption will be calculated by senders and receivers.
Pairing-based cryptography is used in order to compute shared key between the group members. Bilinear-map is a map which is linear in each component [19] . Let say P and Q is a point on group G 1 and G 2 . If e(P, Q) is equal to z, e(aP, bQ) should be z ab . And also e(aP, bQ) is equal to e(bP, aQ).
Let set the key, K as
where y t = f (x t ) i.e., y t is the secret of the user U t . The sender will use its own private key (y i ) and the value sent by receiver (y j P ) and the public information Q. The receiver will obtain the same key by using its own private key y j , value sent by sender (y i P ) and Q.
After this stage, group members can communicate with each other by a symmetric key encryption method. But instead of using different keys for each user, the master key that was selected by GM can be used as the group key. The problem is how the users will recover the master key. We basicly exploit SSS and a symmetric key encryption method to share the master key in the group key agreement stage.
Algorithm 2:
The Group Key Agreement Stage
3 Each user computes
Each user computes H(s ′ ).
Print "Master Key is recovered". Repeat.
The Group Key Agreement Stage 1) Each user shares its own secret key f (x i ) with other users using symmetric key encryption.
2) Each user decrypts the values and obtains m different f (x i ).
3) Each user computes
s ′ = m i=1 f (x i ) m r=1,r =i −x r x i − x r
4) Each user verifies
At the end of the group key agreement stage each member within group will recover the master key as given in the Algorithm 2. After the group key agreement process, the members of the group will be able to communicate with each other using master key. In addition GM
can update x i and f (x i ) values remotely using master key in order to avoid the replay attacks mentioned in the security analysis part of the study.
GM always knows that m user participated the authentication and x m values were used so far. If GMs can coordinate the x values which they used for group authentication, they will use distinct x values for each user. If GMs select different x values and share their polynomial with other GMs, the hand-over process can be done as given in Algorithm 3.
In many studies, group authentication was completed at this point. However, since UAV and
IoT nodes are constantly on the move, they will be able to access the coverage area of another group or the IoT gateway. Instead of repeating the entire process, it is necessary to quickly authenticate the new member. Therefore, each group authentication scheme should have a handover method.
The Hand-Over Stage 1) GM 1 shares group-1 polynomial f (x) with GM 2 by secure channel.
2) GM 2 shares group-2 polynomial g(x) with GM 1 by secure channel.
3) If GM 2 is responsible for hand-over, the user U i ,which wants to participate Group-2, computes f (x i )P 2 and shares x i , f (x i )P 2 with GM 2 (P 2 is public).
4) GM 2 verifies f (x i )P 2 is correct.
5)
If it is correct, GM 2 shares the encryption of Group-2 master key (E e(s 2 f (x i )P 2 ,Q 2 ) [s 2 ]) with
and gets master key of Group-2 for further communications (P 2 and Q 2 are public).
7)
If GM 2 is not responsible for hand-over, U i requests g(x i ) from GM 1 .
8) GM 1 computes g(x i ) and share with U i securely.
10) U i shares x i and g(x i ) · P 2 with any user of Group-2 (U j ).
holds.
13) If it holds, U j shares its public key g(x j )P 2 and the encryption of group-2 master key
and gets master key of group-2 for further communications.
Overall, we propose a comprehensive solution for authentication of users belong both to the same group and to the different groups in three different stages. A group authentication is accomplished with very low computational power on users in the first stage. A master key is recovered by all group users for a distributed environment in the second stage. In the last stage, a user is authenticated by the new group in very short time period. The details of the security and performance analysis is given in the next sections of the study.
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this session, we analyze certain possible attacks to the presented algorithms above.
Theorem 1: Group authentication cannot be performed without t valid public and private values.
Proof. Since the stated polynomial f (x) is of degree t − 1, it is necessary to know t distinct pairs of (x,f (x)) for the formation of the polynomial again. Polynomial cannot be formed again by holding less than t pairs.
Theorem 2:
The attacker who capture the value of Q and P sent by the group manager publicly cannot have knowledge of secret s.
Proof. Given two points P and Q on an elliptic curve group, it is hard to find the s value that provides a relationship like Q = s · P . This open problem is called Eliptic Curve Discrete
Logarithm Problem (ECDLP). Therefore, it hard to find s by having Q and P .
Theorem 3:
The attacker who capture the value of f (x i )P sent by the group members to the group manager cannot have knowledge of f (x i ).
Proof. Due to the hardness assumption of ECDLP, it is hard to find f (x i ) by having f (x i )P .
Theorem 4:
The attacker can capture f (x i )P , e and Q but can not obtain a valid symmetric GM 1 computes g(x i ) and share with U i 10 U i computes g(x i )P 2
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U i shares x i and g(x i )P 2 with any user of group-2 (U j ). be a GRS and group members will be UAVs or sensors. Therefore; group members will have computational and resourse restrictions.
Due to the reasons we mentioned before, we only take into consideration the computations that are made by group members. While each user in Chien algorithm should compute (7m+6785)T mul,q [18] , each user in Harn asynchronous multiple authentication scheme should compute (45m+1418) T mul,q [18] . (T mul,q denote the time for one multiplication in field q where q is 160 bits, m denote the number of user in the group.)
In our proposal the group members should only compute one elliptic curve point multiplication (T EM ). According to Chien [18] , 1 T EM is roughly equal to 29 T mul,p (T mul,p denote the time for one multiplication in field p where p is 1024 bits). The security of ECC with 160-bit key is roughly equivalent to that of RSA with 1024-bit key or D-H algorithm with 1024-bit key.
Therefore; 1 T mul,p is roughly equal to 41 T mul,q [18] . In our authentication algorithm, group members compute 29 T mul,p , which is 1189 (29x41) T mul,q .
Confirmation for authentication process is done by group members in Chien and Harn schemes.
But in our scheme, the GM or only one user is responsible for the confirmation part of the authentication. As you can see from the Fig. 1 , our proposal is scalable with the number of group members.
VI. CONCLUSION
The study proposes a novel method for authentication and hand-over process on group communication in wireless networks. Many-to-many authentication is used for group authentication by several studies but resource-constrained users were forced to compute more than their capacity.
Group members should only compute one elliptic curve point multiplication in the proposed method. Most of the resource-consuming work is done by the GM or one of the group members not all the group members as other proposed methods.
The vulnerabilities which we mentioned in security analysis part are still research area for scientists who study on secret sharing algorithms in group communication. As far as we know there is no proposal for replay, node compromise and DOS attacks under the framework of secret sharing schemes. Our proposal provides the security for replay attacks if the GMs update the credentials for each authentication.
Our study is made by assuming that the group manager or base station is infrastructure based.
For this reason, there is no computation or resource restriction of the base station. However; the base stations are gradually getting mobile and infrastructureless. New methods are needed to deal with these challenges.
SSS and ECC are used on the basis of the proposed algorithms. ECC method is more cost effective than other public key cryptography methods. ECC can be used to perform by the devices with resource and computational restrictions. But even this single operation creates a certain load on the devices. One future work is to find a cross-layer solution that will allow users to send their private keys secretly.
